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     * The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.  
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OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
In 2002, Danielle Stangl and Yvette Koerner initiated a lawsuit against the Port
Authority of Allegheny County and the Port Authority Police Chief, William McArdle,
     1 The District Court held, in the alternative, that even if the Port Authority is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, “then such immunity must be abrogated in this instance
to remedy the alleged unconstitutional conduct that discriminates based upon gender.” 
(App. at 15.)  Because we agree that the Port Authority is not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, we do not reach the abrogation issue.
     2 “Ordinarily we do not have appellate jurisdiction to review district court orders
denying motions to dismiss or for summary judgment because there is no final order
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir.
1994).  We have jurisdiction over an order denying Eleventh Amendment immunity,
however, because “the denial of a defense of sovereign immunity is immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.”  Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 273 F.3d 337, 343 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993)).  As we have explained,
“an order denying a defense of immunity is reviewable before trial because entitlement to
‘immunity from federal claims encompasses not only immunity from liability, but also
immunity from suit.’” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 606 (quoting Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d
1097, 1105 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
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alleging gender discrimination and retaliation.  In May 2005, shortly before the case was
scheduled to go to trial, the Port Authority filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
that it was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The District Court denied the
motion, finding that “the Port Authority is not an alter ego of the Commonwealth, and is
not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”1  (App. at 13.)  The Port
Authority appealed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,2 and will affirm.  
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Subjects of any Foreign
State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.  Eleventh Amendment immunity is available to states, as
well as to any entity that is considered an “arm of the state.”  See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
     3 For many years, we considered the first consideration to be “the most significant
factor.”  Id. (quoting Urbano, 415 F.2d at 251).  Recently, however, we held that we can
“no longer ascribe primacy to this factor.”  Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d
233, 239 (3d Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, “[w]e now accord equal consideration to all three
prongs of the analysis––payment from the state treasury, status under state law, and
autonomy.”  See Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., No. 05-1178, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
9687, at *5 (3d Cir. April 18, 2006).  In close cases, however, where “indicators of
immunity point in different directions,” Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513
U.S. 30, 47 (1994), the Supreme Court dictates that “the principal rationale behind the
Eleventh Amendment–– protection of the sovereignty of states through ‘the prevention of
federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury,’–should ‘remain our
prime guide.’” Febres, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9687, at *5.
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U.S. 651 (1974).  In Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1989), we synthesized the factors to be considered when determining whether an entity is
an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.  We articulated a three prong
analysis, and directed district courts to consider the following questions:
(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would come from the
state (this includes three of the Urbano [v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d
247 (3d Cir. 1969)] factors -- whether payment will come from the state’s
treasury, whether the agency has the money to satisfy the judgment, and
whether the sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for the
agency’s debts);
(2) The status of the agency under state law (this includes four factors --
how state law treats the agency generally, whether the entity is separately
incorporated, whether the agency can sue or be sued in its own right, and
whether it is immune from state taxation); and
(3) What degree of autonomy the agency has.
Id. at 659.3
Here, the District Court found that the first and third factors weighed against
immunity, while the second factor weighed slightly in favor of it.  We need not reprise
those findings.  Suffice it to say that substantially for the reasons set forth in the District
5Court’s well-reasoned opinion, we will affirm.  See Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., No.
05-1178, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9687 (3d Cir. April 18, 2006).
